Introduction

In R. R. Kishore’s paper “Human Organs, Scarcities, and Sale: Morality Revisited,” arguments are made in favour of organ selling. Here, I will describe two of the arguments that Kishore makes in his work, namely i) that human dignity is not violated in organ sales, and ii) that many healthcare services today are already commercialized and disadvantage the poor—and therefore, that such an argument is not sufficient to reject organ selling. I will then present my objections to these claims. To the first, I will argue that while it may appear that human dignity is not violated when viewing the organ-selling transaction between a single donor and buyer, the collective effects of organ-selling in society will lead to a violation of human dignity, because the poor will likely become the greatest source of organs, and dehumanizing attitudes directed towards this population may follow accordingly. To the second, I will argue that just because other health services already disadvantage the poor does not mean that we should implement further practices that will further disadvantage the poor.

 

Definitions

Here, I will define some important terms that will be helpful for our understanding as we go along. Dignity can be defined as the qualities that make us human—i.e., those that are exclusive to humanity (Kishore 408). Such qualities include “…love, trust, righteousness, compassion, tolerance, fairness…” (Kishore 409). Therefore, when an action has “gone against” human dignity, we mean to say that such an action has disrespected these virtues. Furthermore, organ sales in the sense that Kishore is primarily focused on refers to the act of selling a human organ from one living person to another, where the donor survives the removal of the organ.

 

Kishore’s Position on Organ Selling

One argument which Kishore makes in favour of organ selling is that human dignity is not violated in organ sales—on the contrary, he argues that selling an organ is completely in line with human dignity (Kishore 409). Kishore argues that both the donor and the receiver of the organ benefit from the transaction in ways that align with the virtues listed above—for example, the donor may receive money to feed their family, while the recipient may receive the gift of a fuller, longer life—and thus, human dignity is not violated. On the other hand, Kishore believes that prohibitions against organ selling would prevent this (seemingly) beneficial transaction and would thus violate human dignity.

Another claim that Kishore makes in favour of organ selling is that many healthcare services are already commercialized and disadvantage the poor (Kishore 409). Following, he concludes that an argument against organ selling on the grounds that it will unfairly disadvantage the poor is insufficient to prohibit organ selling. To elaborate, he argues that our society is trending towards commercialization, and that a welfare-based healthcare system cannot be obtained; therefore, implementing practices (such as organ selling) which contributes to this overall commercialization is acceptable, as it is just “…part of this overall milieu” (Kishore 410).

 

My Current Position on Organ Selling

Here, I will argue against these two claims made by Kishore, starting with the first. Between a single donor and recipient, organ selling does in fact seem like a win-win situation, as the donor gets the money that she needs, and the recipient gets the organ that he needs. In particular, the virtues of compassion, fairness, and concern for the weak seem to play out very nicely, and human dignity seems to be preserved (Kishore 409). However, when such organ transactions occur on a societal level, we would begin to see that human dignity is not preserved at all. To elaborate, if organ sales are legalized, the poverty-stricken communities will be the first to sell their organs to obtain more resources for survival. If most organs on sale are from the poor societies in our world, then we may start viewing various impoverished populations as “organ reservoirs” (Kishore 408), which may produce the implicit, dehumanizing attitude that the bodies of these impoverished individuals are a sort of commodity (which thus violates their human dignity). Historical evidence in the form of slavery, concentration camps, and residential schools have already shown us the terrible effects of these dehumanizing attitudes, which I fear may repeat itself in a similar fashion if we legalize organ selling.

Let us now turn to Kishore’s second argument. Kishore argues that since we are at the point of no return from the growing commercialization of our healthcare system, we can continue to implement practices that would further such commercialization. However, I believe that we should be trying to resist such commercialization by taking little steps in the right direction, even if we cannot completely free ourselves from the inequalities that are currently embedded in our healthcare system. In other words, I believe that we should try to rework the policies which are unfairly disadvantaging the poor and refusing to adopt policies that will encourage us to further this commercialization and ensuing inequality (such as the legalization of organ selling), rather than accepting the situation and making no effort to change it.

In my view, the seemingly beneficial action of organ selling would not outweigh the significant potential harm inflicted if organ selling is legalized, because it will violate human dignity and perpetuate inequality in society; therefore, I will conclude that organ selling should not be legalized.

 

Works Cited

Kishore R. R. “Human Organs, Scarcities, and Sale: Morality Revisited.” Biomedical Ethics: A Canadian Focus,” edited by Johnna Fisher, J.S. Russell, Alister Browne, and Leslie Burkholder, Oxford UP, 2018, pp. 407-412.